Large Language Models (LLM) with reasoning capabilities offer a promising path for improving candidate evaluation in planning frameworks, but their relative performance against traditional non-reasoning models remains largely underexplored. In this study, we benchmark a distilled 1.5B parameter reasoning model (DeepSeek-R1) against several state-of-the-art non-reasoning LLMs within a generator-discriminator LLM planning framework for the text-to-SQL task. For this, we introduce a novel method for extracting soft scores from the chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs from reasoning that enables fine-grained ranking of candidates. Our central hypothesis is that reasoning models are more effective discriminators than non-reasoning LLMs. Our results show that distilled DeepSeek-R1-1.5B achieves up to $87\%$ higher F1 and $3.7\%$ better discrimination accuracy than CodeLlama-7B, as well as $3.7\%$ higher execution accuracy than CodeLlama-13B, despite having significantly fewer parameters. Furthermore, we find that there is a limit to the logical capabilities of reasoning models, and only providing more context or allowing more compute budget for reasoning is not enough to improve their discrimination performance. Finally, we demonstrate that, unlike non-reasoning LLMs, reasoning models find generation more challenging than discrimination and may underperform as generators compared to smaller non-reasoning LLMs. Our work highlights the potential of reasoning models as discriminators in agentic frameworks, far outweighing their capabilities as generators, offering insights into their optimal role within LLM planning infrastructures.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.